

# The truth of the artwork From the artistic object to the artwork as a Loop

*La verdad de la obra de arte  
Desde el objeto artístico hasta la obra de arte como un Loop*

*La verità dell'opera d'arte  
Dall'oggetto artistico all'opera d'arte come loop*

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## ABSTRACT RESUMEN

Through the interpretations of artwork provided by Hegel, Kant, and Heidegger, the artwork presents itself as complex and often irreducible. The reading offered by Harman, grounded in Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), constructs a historically significant interpretation but does not exhaust the problematic nature of artwork represents. Through this article, I have attempted to demonstrate the functionality of the concept of loop applied to artwork, providing general connotations and linguistic tools for interpreting artwork as a loop.



A través de las interpretaciones de la obra de arte proporcionadas por Hegel, Kant y Heidegger, la obra de arte se presenta como compleja y a menudo irreducible. La lectura ofrecida por Harman, fundamentada en la Ontología Orientada a los Objetos (OOO), construye una interpretación históricamente significativa pero no agota la naturaleza problemática que la obra de arte representa. A través de este artículo, he intentado demostrar la funcionalidad del concepto de loop aplicado a la obra de arte, proporcionando connotaciones generales y herramientas lingüísticas para interpretar la obra de arte como un loop.

## KEYWORDS PALABRAS CLAVE

OOO, art, Object, Harman, ASD, Loop.

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**ABSTRACT ITA** **PAROLE CHIAVE**

Attraverso le interpretazioni dell'opera d'arte fornite da Hegel, Kant e Heidegger, l'opera d'arte si presenta come complessa e spesso irriducibile. La lettura offerta da Harman e improntata sull'Ontologia Orientata agli Oggetti (OOO) costruisce una lettura storicamente importante ma che non esaurisce la problematicità che l'opera d'arte rappresenta. Si è cercato, attraverso questo articolo, di mostrare la funzionalità del concetto di loop applicato all'opera d'arte, fornendo connotati generali e strumenti linguistici per l'interpretazione dell'opera d'arte come loop.

OOO, arte, Oggetto, Harman, ASD, Loop

## 1. Introduction

In che modo cominciare  
un discorso filosofico sull'estetica?  
(Derrida, 1981)

Entering the Musée d'Orsay, you can find displayed a canvas about 70 centimeters high and 95 centimeters wide depicting a mountain. It is the representation of Montagne Sainte-Victoire, a mountain visible from Aix-en-Provence, France. In the painting, on the left side of the mountain, there is a large tree that in perspective appears to be even taller than the mountain itself. The sky is speckled with some white clouds, and the rest of the landscape dissolves stroke by stroke among a bridge and some small houses, some plots of land whose boundaries are indistinguishable, and other trees. Around the world, there are over 40 reproductions of this mountain, all made by Cézanne, who wished to convey the truth of this mountain to the viewers, a truth that kept him awake, driving him to paint incessantly, even on the day of his mother's death.

What kind of truth can a painter bring into their artwork? It is necessary to philosophically understand how this theme has been approached, often debated, and still today manages to stimulate analysis and discussions. To grasp the contours of the issue, one must start with Hegel, seeking to understand how the concept of artwork in Hegel relates to Cézanne, and subsequently analyze the role of the beautiful and the sublime. The next step will be to understand how these terms are analyzed today and what might still be the problematic points that this kind of approach poses, delving into not only the painting as object, in this case, the painting of Montagne Sainte-Victoire, but more broadly into the mountain as object, its truth, the role of the spectator, and that of the painter, in this case, Cézanne.

## 2. Aesthetics and the Sublime

Vi devo la verità  
in pittura e ve la dirò.  
(Paul Cézanne)

In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel writes:

“Se si vuole stabilire uno scopo finale dell’opera d’arte, esso consiste in ciò: rivelare la verità, rappresentare quel che si agita nel petto umano, e tutto ciò per via di immagini, in maniera concreta. Questo scopo finale l’arte lo ha in comune con la storia, la religione, e altro.

[Bisogna allontanare la rappresentazione erronea che l’arte abbia al di fuori di sé uno scopo in-e-per-sé-essente, per la realizzazione del quale sia semplice mezzo]”<sup>1</sup> (Hegel, 2000, 31)

This passage, which introduces much of Hegel’s aesthetic thought, will serve as a guide throughout the analysis that follows, both because it proves problematic for Hegel himself and because it still today provides the framework for philosophical analyses such as the one carried out by Harman (Harman, 2023) in OOO.

Hegel immediately shows us the fundamental connection between artwork and truth. In this sense, the truth of artwork lies in its final purpose, but he also adds that it must represent what stirs in the human breast. Therefore, the connection with humanity rather than nature significantly determines the field of action in which we can work, according to Hegel, to understand what artwork is. The elements provided by the German philosopher thus appear as follows: the inherent truth of artwork, its relationship with the human, and the shared purpose among art, history, religion, and all other intellectual human productions.

We will proceed by trying to understand these three points starting from the last up to the first, which turns out to be, for this analysis, the

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<sup>1</sup> “If one wants to establish a final purpose of artwork, it consists of this: to reveal the truth, to represent what stirs in the human breast, and all of this through images, in a concrete manner. This final purpose art shares with history, religion, and other things. [We must dispel the mistaken notion that art has outside of itself a purpose existing-in-and-for-itself, for the achievement of which it is a mere means.]”.

most complex and provides the fundamental transition between Hegel's analyses and those of contemporary scholars.

For Hegel, art shares its final purpose with history, religion, and other realms. This assertion is crucial for understanding the circular movement that Hegel undertakes, as it is the same structure found in his other analyses. The product of art, as with other productions of the spirit, is indeed the spirit itself, which requires, in this case as in others, the individual who carries out this production, with a history, with their studies, knowledge, a knowledge of their own production. Here we have the mechanism of circularity that Hegel presupposes; the spirit must be the origin of the work in which it converges, converging within itself fundamentally because, as Hegel himself writes, the spirit of artistic production is autonomous. Precisely because it is autonomous, it guarantees circularity, an introduction to itself, thus a movement of creation within what already is spirit.

The autonomy of the artwork is thus already inscribed in a circularity. In fact, Hegel clearly writes about this in the subsequent pages of the lectures on aesthetics:

*“L'arte deve dunque soddisfare alla richiesta di lasciar apparire nel finito come tale la sua infinita in-sé-essente, essa è la manifestazione dell'anima immanente nel corporeo.*

*L'arte deve dunque rendere ovunque trasparente quel che per la coscienza prosaica è presente solo come finito, in modo tale che esso riveli in tutti gli organi il tono dell'anima, lo spirituale.”<sup>2</sup> (Hegel, 77)*

This kind of tension between the painting object, its representation, and the display of the spirit is something very close to the relationship between OR-QS discussed by Harman:

*“Con estetica la OOO intende la teoria generale di come gli oggetti differiscono dalle loro qualità. Dato che ci sono due tipi di oggetti e due di qualità, ci sono quattro classi separate di fenomeni estetici: OR-QR, OR-QS, OS-QS, e*

<sup>2</sup> “Art must therefore meet the demand to allow its infinite in-and-for-itself to appear within the finite as such; it is the manifestation of the immanent soul in the corporeal. Art must therefore render transparent everywhere what for prosaic consciousness is present only as finite, in such a way that it reveals in all organs the tone of the soul, the spiritual.”

OS-QR<sup>3</sup> (Harman, 2023). [...] È solo nella tensione OR-QS che troviamo la bellezza, che considero senza esitazione l'ambito dell'arte, anche se molti artisti oggi non vogliono avere nulla a che fare con la bellezza, ma piuttosto aggirano la questione in favore di questioni socio-politiche o altro, dato che la politica emancipatoria è la grande fede intellettuale della nostra epoca." (Harman, 2023, 72)

But what kind of relationship exists between these two aspects? Between the object in its objectual dimension, precisely, and the sensible qualities of this object that are experienced? We need to return to the second part of the first Hegel's quote, when the German philosopher writes: "We must dispel the mistaken notion that art has outside of itself a purpose existing-in-and-for-itself, for the achievement of which it is a mere means." Does the idea that artwork has an internal purpose close off the artwork, making it unreachable for the spectator? What role does the spectator play in this relationship? Hegel further writes:

"L'opera d'arte deve avere come contenuto gli interessi più elevati dello spirito e della volontà, ed essi devono tralucere attraverso l'esteriorità dell'esistenza, il loro accento deve risuonare ovunque. Se questo accade, se alla base ci sono interessi sostanziali, l'opera d'arte è in sé oggettiva e parla anche alla nostra soggettività. Infatti i veri interessi ci sono familiari. Questo è l'accordo tra l'opera d'arte e noi. Se essa è grande produce il suo effetto."<sup>4</sup> (Hegel, 111)

Now we have all the basic elements to begin understanding the issue in Hegelian terms, but we also have a trace to follow the developments of this analysis within the philosophical framework of more contemporary currents. Indeed, the tension between the object and its sensible qualities is not a neutral tension; it is not a tension that is exhausted on one side, remaining guarded in the artistic object, and on the other in the attempt of a spectator, of a person, to grasp the spirit of the artwork. On the contrary, to understand it, it is almost necessary to speak of the

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<sup>3</sup> By the letters the following words are identified: O: objects, R: real, Q: quality, S: sensorial. To further investigate the meaning of these terms and their relation see Harman G., *Art and Objects*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2019.

<sup>4</sup> "The artwork must have as its content the highest interests of the spirit and the will, and they must shine through the externality of existence; their accent must resonate everywhere. If this happens, if there are substantial interests at the base, the artwork is in itself objective and also speaks to our subjectivity. Indeed, true interests are familiar to us. This is the agreement between the artwork and us. If it is great, it produces its effect."

beautiful and particularly of the concept of the sublime, analyzed by Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and revisited by Harman. In this passage, the sublime is described in these terms:

“Kant ci dice inizialmente che “il bello si accorda con il sublime” (CdG, p.159). Entrambi sono slegati da qualsiasi forma di interesse, dunque piacciono “per se stessi” (CdG, p. 159). Entrambi devono, inoltre, essere singolari, nel senso che “il cielo stellato è sempre sublime”, sarebbe un puro giudizio logico, proprio come “tutte le rose/tutti i tulipani sono belli”. Il sublime si può sentire soltanto riguardo a un’esperienza specifica del cielo stellato, non rispetto all’intera classe di esperienze astronomiche a priori. Dovrebbe altresì essere ovvio che nessuna esperienza del sublime può essere sostituita da una descrizione letterale, più di quanto non possa esserlo il bello. Eppure, ci sono anche delle differenze tra i due. Ecco la più importante per noi: “il bello della natura riguarda la forma dell’oggetto, la quale consiste nella limitazione [dell’oggetto stesso]; il sublime, invece, si può trovare anche in un oggetto privo di forma, in quanto implichi o provochi la rappresentazione dell’illimitatezza.” (Harman, 2023, 93)

This analysis by Harman echoes a reading offered by Derrida on the aesthetic texts of Kant and Hegel, in which he articulates the same problem almost in the same manner:

“Nell’esperienza del bello si ha una esaltazione ed una accelerazione della vita, la sensazione si può unire facilmente alla forza ludica dell’immaginazione e alle sue attrattive. Nella sensazione del sublime, invece, il piacere «ha una origine» solo «indiretta». Viene in seguito all’inibizione, all’arresto, alla sospensione che trattengono le forze vitali. Questa sospensione è seguita da una improvvisa effusione, da un riversarsi tanto più forte delle forze vitali. [...] Esperienza violenta, in cui non si scherza, non si gioca più, non ci si compiace (positivamente) né ci si accontenta delle «attrattive» della seduzione.”<sup>5</sup> (Derrida, 1981, 124)

<sup>5</sup> “In the experience of the beautiful, there is an exaltation and an acceleration of life; sensation can easily unite with the playful force of imagination and its attractions. In the sensation of the sublime, however, pleasure ‘has an indirect origin.’ It follows inhibition, arrest, suspension that hold back vital forces. This suspension is followed by a sudden outpouring, a pouring forth all the stronger of vital forces. [...] A violent experience, in which there is no joking, no more playing, no satisfaction (positively) nor contentment with the ‘attractions’ of seduction.”

Here, the sublime becomes, as Harman also wrote, formless precisely because it is immeasurable; it is a pleasure that confronts the inadequacy of the spectator, of the one who should grasp it, who, as Derrida writes, finds himself faced with a negative pleasure. And it is through the sublime that we can once again talk about artwork and its relationship with the spectator because, in light of this brief reconstruction, it is possible to begin to understand the thread that connects the view of artwork to Hegel, to phenomenology, and ultimately to the Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) extensively discussed by Harman. However, we must briefly return to Cézanne's mountains.

### 3. The artwork as an object

Secondo me non ci sostituisce al passato,  
si aggiunge soltanto un nuovo anello alla catena.  
[Paul Cézanne, lettera del 23 gennaio 1905]

What Cézanne sought to achieve with the representation of the mountains of Sainte-Victoire is impossible to say. One can refer to his letters, his writings, writings about him by his acquaintances, friends, painters, but one can also refer to him by looking at his paintings. Ultimately, what Cézanne wanted to do does interest us in order to look at his mountains? What role does the author play in the production of the artwork? Is it possible that the artwork is only a relationship between the produced object and the consuming subject?

Hegel had a vision of the artist as part of the people; the artist could never be a subject estranged from the culture, from the spirit of the people itself; an Arab painter could never paint the Virgin Mary. For Hegel, the artist must be integrated into the spirit, with which ultimately unity is achieved. Hegel writes, in fact, that the artist is in unity with the object that inspires him, and his role is nothing but to bring to consciousness through art this substantiality, the spirit.

When we find ourselves at the Musée d'Orsay facing Sainte-Victoire, what do we have before us? In what terms can we speak of the portrayed mountains? Harman writes about Heidegger:

*“Percepire qualcosa direttamente con la mente non significa catturare la sua realtà per intero: nessuna somma complessiva delle vedute di una montagna, per esempio, potrà mai sostituire l'esistenza di quella montagna, proprio*



come l'insieme di tutte le sostanze chimiche organiche non esaurisce l'esistenza del loro componente chiave, il carbonio. Anche se Dio potesse cogliere tutti i fianchi di una montagna simultaneamente da ogni possibile punto di vista, non sarebbe sufficiente: la montagna non è semplicemente una somma di vedute [...]. Al contrario la montagna è la realtà che rende possibili, in primo luogo, tutte le vedute." (Harman, 2023)

Harman extends this relationship not only to artwork but to any object, and thus we come to understand the artistic tension between OR-QS, where objects always seem beyond human reach, where humans can only perceive their sensible qualities incompletely and confront the sublime. But what are the modes of grasping reality? Of grasping these objects? Fundamentally, there remains a phenomenological structure of OOO, which is why sensible qualities, as grasped by human beings, in the unequal relationship they create with artwork, remain fundamentally devoid of relationality, to the point where they seem mere human attempts to relate to what is not relatable: artwork as an object. Here, the circularity established by Hegel is definitively broken because the relationship between artwork and spectator operates on two different planes, that of quantity (the sublime) of the artwork and that of quality (the beautiful) of the spectator.

With this point, Harman has already dealt, although not exactly with this issue, but more broadly with the spectator. Michael Fried (Fried, 1998) in "Art and Objecthood," writes:

*"Tutto conta - non come parte dell'oggetto, ma della situazione in cui l'oggettualità è stabilita e da cui l'oggettualità stessa dipende almeno in parte" (Fried, 1998, 155)*

Fried almost overlaps the figures of the spectator and the situation, something that Hegel wouldn't have endorsed in these terms. However, it's interesting to note how Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), on the contrary, defends the total autonomy of artwork from the situation and the spectator, even though the spectator is indeed a part of it. Harman asserts multiple times in his writings that from this perspective, artwork is considered in the manner of the strictest formalism. In fact, artwork, like any other object, is destined for an autonomy that isolates it from the environment and the spectator.

To understand how to transition from the QS, which are apprehensible by the spectator, to the OR, which Harman still relates within the object that the spectator and the artwork create, the QS must be sayable, or at least apprehensible. This is where the tool of knowledge, that OOO sets forth in this sense<sup>6</sup>, comes into play, through undermining (undermining from below - the components of objects are irreducible from below) and overmining (undermining from above - objects are irreducible in their effects), or if both modes are applied, duomining (undermining from both above and below). These are three modes of reduction, one of which is the combination of the two main ones. Harman asserts that these two main modes (and their combination) are the only two types of knowledge we have. (Harman, 2023, 42-43)

From these premises, it is not clear how the OR-QS pair is created because if it does not form in the relationship, thus presenting itself as relational, in what way does the connection between the object and its sensible qualities manifest? How do I know that the sensible qualities are in some relationship with an object undermined from both above and below, ultimately autonomous and irreducible? On the other hand, if they were not, how would one establish a new object formed by the spectator and the artwork together (obviously, this new object also proves to be irreducible, displaying a certain staticity in the relationship)?

Additionally, the representation of the sensible qualities of the object seems to inherit a phenomenological thrust while remaining within the horizon of the impossibility of phenomenology itself to realize. The possibility of stating the existence of the unsayable remains, in principle, the possibility that the object offers to the spectator. But stating the unsayable is not possible, precisely, so that statement becomes an approach to the unsayable in a phenomenological manner, confronting the sublime of the artwork itself. However, in this, the inheritance of what is called correlationism seems to not entirely leave OOO independent, which on the contrary is precisely in the comparison and distancing that it strongly shows the tribute.

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<sup>6</sup> In this sense, the artwork is set as object of analysis, but OOO broadens this model to other type of objects.

#### 4. The staticity and loop

La nostra vita moderna è tale che, trovandoci davanti alle ripetizioni più meccaniche, più stereotipate, dentro di noi e fuori di noi, non cessiamo di estrarne piccole differenze, varianti, modificazioni.<sup>7</sup>  
(Deleuze, 1971, 4)

Speaking further about the unsayable, it is ultimately crucial to dwell on the issue of the staticity of the object, which, in order to have an irreducible foundation, should therefore be conceived on a monodimensional ontological scale, albeit a flat one. The irreducibility of an object appears to be close to an unreachable and unspeakable point in objectual composition.

However, this perspective complicates the possibility of the object persisting over time, as time itself, if we admit its existence, is movement; therefore, the same irreducible should change, but can what cannot be related change? Through what modes does it change?

In this sense, it may be more consistent to refer to a new structure that exploits Nietzschean insights of the eternal return of the same and of artwork as a natural outgrowth from human animal biology generated by the death of God. Vanessa Lemm writes about this:

“La critica mossa da Nietzsche alla concezione tradizionale della cultura (a cui mi sono già riferita in termini di “civilizzazione”) scioglie l’animale e libera così la possibilità di creare nuove forme di vita. La morte di Dio così come morte dell’umano consente di recuperare una nuova relazione tra natura e creatività, e comprendere finalmente cosa significhi per l’animale umano essere “più naturale” e creativo.”<sup>8</sup> (Lemm, 2020, 121)

<sup>7</sup> Our modern life is such that, when faced with the most mechanical, most stereotyped repetitions, both within us and outside of us, we continue to extract small differences, variations, modifications.

<sup>8</sup> “Nietzsche’s criticism of the traditional conception of culture (which I have already referred to in terms of ‘civilization’) dissolves the animal and thus frees the possibility of creating new forms of life. The death of God, as well as the death of the human, allows for the recovery of a new relationship between nature and creativity, and finally understand what it means for the human animal to be ‘more natural’ and creative.”

Here, the artwork in Nietzsche definitively breaks with historical structures. However, it is not so much this aspect that proves interesting, but the need to rethink artwork as the natural outcome of human outflow. The production of artwork, which is not treated as central in Harman's perspective, is here shown to be crucial for understanding the artwork that does not exhibit staticity, but instead forms in an ambivalent manner, both relational and autonomous, both in relation to artistic creation and autonomously, outside of history.

This way of conceiving artwork can be constructed in harmony with another foundational idea of Nietzschean thought, the idea of the eternal return of the same. Placing artwork within this circular movement moves beyond the punctual staticity of two-dimensional flatness and relates to time as well, forming a loop that could be defined as ontological as it manifests an essence that, nevertheless, is never identical to itself, being in circular motion, and where the artwork finds its rest.

The circular movement opens up to external forces, such as that of the spectator, forming a new loop constantly in motion. Loops have the ability to resolve the staticity that ontology assigns to the relationship and constantly change, being inherent in the openness that modifies the loop and creates a new one.

From this perspective, the relationship between the QS and the OR is one of constant movement, a movement that provides the characteristics to the QS and the incessant exchange with the OR, which we will call the artistic loop as it has lost the irreducibility characteristics that OOO confers to the artwork itself. Each artistic loop therefore enters into a new loop with the spectator, which is not only modified by the artwork itself but also modifies it in its circularity.

Those commonly defined as objects occur at intervals of time that are imperceptible to human senses; physics shows us that they are not entirely static, but rather in constant motion, and that the movement within them occurs repetitively. This mode of repetition can be overlooked by human animals only when we deal with a coarse sensitivity that has no correspondence with quantum physics, with its microscopic components.

And here we are again, for the last time, in front of the mountains of Sainte-Victoire painted by Cézanne, the very same mountains that are

impossible to represent for what they are through the artwork. Indeed, the irreducibility of the original mountain is understandable because it resides in a loop of which is impossible to comprehend where and how it was originated, or from which concatenation of previous loops it had its genesis. It is also equally true that the representations of those mountains, the over 40 mountains together for Cézanne (but also for us spectators), form a certain type of artistic loop. However, in the singularity of each mountain, they form another artistic loop that is influenced by the loops created with each of the spectators, critics, contexts, and historicity that the artwork preserves not so much in its structure but in its very essence as a loop.

In this sense, the spectator and the artwork form a new loop of enjoyment that captures the sensible qualities of the painting and does not exhaust itself in apprehension, not because there is an unreachable essence elsewhere, but because, on the contrary, the loop that the artwork is, is sublime. It operates on the quality and quantity of its movement and remains never entirely perceptible to the beholder.

Returning to Vanessa Lemm's analysis of Nietzsche's artist and artwork, some passages are useful for a better understanding of the loop concept starting from the Nietzschean conception. Vanessa Lemm writes:

*“È per questo che Nietzsche osserva il processo di creazione come quella complessa relazione tra l'artista e il suo tempo che può essere detta il “genio”. Stagliandosi sul divenire storico, che Nietzsche concepisce come un alternarsi di permanenza e dissoluzione, il genio emerge nella sua radicale contingenza, culminando in un'opera impossibile da attribuire a un artista.”<sup>9</sup> (Lemm, 2020, 122)*

Here, evidently, something happens between history and the artist, between the artwork and history. The alternation of permanence and dissolution is exactly the circular movement that genius performs, managing to position itself in its time, open the loop, and modify it, thereby creating a new loop of which its movement has been part, but no longer it, because it resides in a new loop. Thus, the artwork establishes

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<sup>9</sup> “This is why Nietzsche observes the process of creation as that complex relationship between the artist and his time, which can be called ‘genius.’ Standing out against the historical becoming, which Nietzsche conceives as an alternation of permanence and dissolution, genius emerges in its radical contingency, culminating in a work impossible to attribute to a single artist.”

its own artistic loop, which in a certain sense encompasses historicity and the role of the artist, but also encompasses what is beyond these factors. Gilles Deleuze helps in understanding this movement:

“Il rapporto sintetico che l’attimo ha con sé in quanto presente, passato e futuro fonda il rapporto con gli altri attimi. L’eterno ritorno è così la risposta al problema del passare; esso perciò non va interpretato come ritorno di un qualcosa, di un uno o di un medesimo. Intendere l’espressione “eterno ritorno” come ritorno del medesimo è un errore, perché il ritornare non appartiene all’essere ma, al contrario, lo costituisce in quanto affermazione del divenire e di ciò che passa, così come non appartiene all’uno ma lo costituisce in quanto affermazione del diverso o del molteplice. In altre parole, nell’eterno ritorno l’identità non indica la natura di ciò che ritorna, ma, al contrario, il ritornare del differente; perciò l’eterno ritorno dev’essere pensato come sintesi: sintesi del tempo e delle sue dimensioni, sintesi del diverso e della sua riproduzione, sintesi del divenire e dell’essere che si afferma dal divenire, sintesi della doppia affermazione. L’eterno ritorno, allora, non dipende da un principio di identità ma da un principio che, per tutti questi aspetti, deve soddisfare le esigenze di una vera ragione sufficiente.”<sup>10</sup> (Deleuze, 2002, 72-73)

Deleuze demonstrates how the relationship between being and becoming occurs primarily as a function of a movement that is also simultaneously static, an affirmation of being as the becoming of what passes and returns, and that could ultimately have the structure of a nebulous, one might say quantum, loop that has the concept of openness as its founding constitution. The loop becomes the synthesis of the movement

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<sup>10</sup> “The synthetic relationship that the moment has with itself as present, past, and future forms the relationship with other moments. The eternal return is thus the answer to the problem of passing; therefore, it should not be interpreted as the return of something, someone, or the same. To understand the expression ‘eternal return’ as the return of the same is an error because the act of returning does not belong to being but, on the contrary, constitutes it as an affirmation of becoming and of what passes, just as it does not belong to the one but constitutes it as an affirmation of the different or the multiple. In other words, in the eternal return, identity does not indicate the nature of what returns, but, on the contrary, the return of the different; therefore, the eternal return must be thought of as synthesis: synthesis of time and its dimensions, synthesis of the different and its reproduction, synthesis of becoming and the being that affirms itself from becoming, synthesis of double affirmation. The eternal return, then, does not depend on a principle of identity but on a principle that, for all these aspects, must satisfy the requirements of a true sufficient reason.”

of repetition that occurs in time and in temporal dimensions, not only, precisely, point-like, but on the contrary in three (or more) dimensions.

This is why, to continue quoting Deleuze, the eternal return does not work on the principle of identity because identity does not satisfy in any way the temporal structure of becoming identical to itself through repetition. On the contrary, identity is always movement, it is always loss of identity, in the repetition of the same until the connection, reconnection, with new repetitive loops, which, arranged through the concept of openness, reshape and propose the repetitiveness that is structural.

This kind of movement has been studied for several years in the field of human mind research within certain forms of pathology, but there are studies showing how this formulation of thinking and acting can also weakly extend to the stages of growth and development in children. Repetitiveness, which we define as loops, is not only associated with a certain way of philosophically understanding existence, which is also developed here starting from artwork, but it is also the basis of recent studies on functionality that are not only existential but also on the learning of individuals in infancy<sup>11</sup> (Langen et al, 2011, 356-365) , adulthood, and in cases of autism spectrum disorder (Lam K. S. L. and Aman G. M, 2007, 855-866).

## 5. Conclusions

Facing a work of art is something complex, both in terms of the movement triggered by the artwork itself and the impossibility of overlaying our own loop-being with the artistic loop of the work. Fundamental in this sense is the concept of openness, although this is not the place to discuss and analyze it. However, in this context, openness is the tool through which the two loops reformulate themselves into a new loop that will

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<sup>11</sup> "During early development, children engage in a significant amount of ritualistic, repetitive, and compulsive-like activity that is part of the normal behavioral repertoire (Evans et al., 1997). This developmental phase is characterized by perfectionism, preoccupation with ordering objects just-so, attachment to a favorite object, concerns about dirt and cleanliness, preferred household routines, actions repeated over and over or a specific number of times, rituals for eating, awareness of minute details in the home, hoarding, and bedtime rituals (Boyer and Liénard, 2006). It is thought that such ritualization and compulsions may serve to ward off anxiety (Evans et al., 1997) and may represent a mechanism for organizing, accommodating to and eventually mastering the environment (Gesell et al., 1974). In other words: childhood rituals are hypothesized to be a way to calibrate the system (Boyer and Liénard, 2006)"

dissolve in a non-exhaustive manner when moving away from the artwork. Both loops will continue to bear traces, within their movement, of all the infinite loops they have come into contact with.

The loop resolves, in this sense, some of the problematic aspects highlighted by OOO, which mainly reside in the possibility of expressing the irreducibility of the object and understanding how irreducible and non-relational objects come together to form new objects. In this sense, the mobility of the loop movement arranged in openness allows for incessant movement between artwork and beholder and enables the confluence of the artwork's unsayability, which still is present precisely because of its characteristics, in the impossibility of overlapping the two loops, exploiting what Kant's decisive intuition regarding the sublime, previously analyzed through Derrida.

Many aspects of the loop may still seem not easily understandable, as it fundamentally diverges from a proper ontology for reasons fundamentally linked to the static nature of perspective. The loop is a tool that does not work on the idea but on its dissolution into movement, thus allowing the opening movement a centrality that we can find not only in the history of philosophy. Derrida goes through Heidegger's philosophy to speak of a cleft where, however, the cleft is always external; in this case, the cleft occurs within the movement itself, placing itself in the structure of the loop, which is always in the repetition available for change, restructuring, relocation, expansion, and reduction, dissolution as well as reformulation.

Precisely due to this distancing, we find the loop never completely connoted; it is not a circularity but has to do with a nuanced nebulousness and is always available to attract energy. In this way, the loop is not ontological; its essence lies in movement, in never being stable, but it is never entirely relational because it rests in its movement, returns to itself if not disturbed, tends towards conservation where conservation is ultimately impossible in the space of sharing with other loops.

The artwork is the exemplary object of this kind of theory because it clearly shows its stability and movement, its finiteness and infiniteness simultaneously; the mechanism of the sublime shows the impossibility for any loop to deal with loops of immeasurable vastness that we could define as colossal.



Thus, the mountains drawn by Cézanne are nothing but the unattainable measure of Cézanne's own relationship with a nature that overshadowed him: the relationship of a loop that came into contact with a colossal loop and tried to account for the sublime through an artwork.

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## Dipinti

Paul Cézanne, Montagne Sainte-Victoire, Huile sur toile, Musée d'Orsay, 1890.

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